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Abstract
Paths in a given network (map) are a generalised
form of time-serial chains in many real world appli-
cations, such as trajectories and Internet flows. Dif-
ferentially private trajectory publishing concerns
publishing path information that is usable to the
genuine users yet secure against adversaries to
reconstruct the path with maximum background
knowledge. The exiting studies all assume this
knowledge to be all but one vertex on the path, i.e.,
the adversaries have the knowledge of the network
topology and the path but one missing vertex (and
its two connected edges) on the path. To prevent
the adversaries recovering the missing information,
they publish a perturbed path where each vertex
is sampled from a pre-defined set with differential
privacy (DP) to replace the corresponding vertex
in the original path. In this paper, we relax this
assumption to be all but one edge on the path, and
hence consider the scenario of more powerful adver-
saries with the maximum background knowledge of
the entire network topology and the path (includ-
ing all the vertices) except one (arbitrary) miss-
ing edge. Under such assumption, the perturbed
path produced by the existing work is vulnerable,
because the adversary can reconstruct the missing
edge from the existence of an edge in the perturbed
path whose two ends are close to the two ends of
the missing edge. To address this vulnerability and
effectively protect edge privacy, instead of publish-
ing a perturbed path, we propose a novel scheme of
graph-based path publishing to protect the original
path by embedding the path in a graph that con-
tains fake edges and replicated vertices applying
the differential privacy technique, such that only
the legitimate users who have the full knowledge of
the network topology are able to recover the exact
vertices and edges of the original path with high
probability. We theoretically analyse the perfor-
mance of our algorithm in terms of output quality
differential privacy and utility, and execution ef-
ficiency. We also conduct extensive experimental
evaluations on a high-performance cluster system
to validate our analytical results.
1 Introduction
Paths are pervasive in our daily life, such as,
geometric trajectory, internet traffic flow, supply
chain, and intelligence exchange network [10, 11].
Publishing a path helps the owners of the path dis-
cover more knowledge about the path and obtain
the information about their roles on the path. How-
ever, attackers may infer the privacy of a path from
its published information by applying their auxil-
iary information [6, 24]. Therefore, it is crucial to
consider privacy disclosure risks when publishing a
path.
In this paper, we consider path publishing
against adversaries with the maximum knowledge
of the network topology but an arbitrary edge to
infer the path (edge). That is, given a network
N = (V,E), we publish a path P = (V,EP ⊂ E)
protecting an arbitrary edge e ∈ EP against ad-
versaries who have N ′ = (V,E \ {e}) containing
P ′ = (V,EP \ {e}) containing P ′ = (V,EP \ {e}).
This problem can be found in several real-life sce-
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narios:
Supply Chain. In this scenario, N is a service
system of an organisation; V is the set of service
suppliers; E is the set of resource transfer links; P
is a supply chain; path publishing is the way to en-
sure every supplier knows how resources are trans-
ferred; ”adversaries” are competing organisations
which want to know how the target organisation
allocates the resources.
Intelligence Exchange. In this scenario, N is
a spy network; V is the set of spies; E is the set
of spy communication channels; P is the message
exchange path; path publishing is the way to let all
spies know whom should be contacted with; ”ad-
versaries” are counter-intelligence units who want
to know how a targeted spy exchanges information
with others.
Presently, privacy-preserving path publishing
against the maximum background knowledge is well
studied in trajectory publishing with differential
privacy (DP) [7] because DP is a promising pri-
vacy notion due to its privacy-preserving guaran-
tee against the attackers with arbitrary auxiliary
information. Particularly, there are two tracks of
research in differentially private trajectory pub-
lishing: set of trajectories publishing [5, 16, 25,
18, 4, 1, 13, 21] and (single) trajectory publish-
ing [17, 30, 14, 27, 28, 3]. In this paper we address
the problem in the latter track.
In a nutshell, existing studies in the differen-
tially private trajectory publishing share a similar
idea in two-fold. First of all, they take the same
assumption on the adversaries’ background knowl-
edge. That is, the adversaries have full information
about the map (network) except some locations
(and all edges incident to them) in the target trajec-
tory. In the worst case, only one location is missing
at the attacker’s side. Second, they use exponential
mechanism of DP (ExpDP) to implement differen-
tial privacy. Specifically, the published trajectory
contains fake locations only, which are sampled via
ExpDP from a predefined area, to replace the real
ones in the target trajectory. The differences over
these methods mainly come from the quality mea-
surement for sampling the fake locations due to dif-
ferent objectives, such as the temporal-spatio rela-
tionships between locations [30, 3], the utility of the
fake locations, including movement directions in a
trajectory [17] and similarity between the real and
the fake locations [14, 27].
The state-of-the-art results in single trajectory
publishing achieve a satisfying trade-off between
utility and privacy by DP against adversaries with
missing vertices; however, we discover two weak-
nesses in the existing work [17, 14, 30, 27, 3]. First,
the assumption of missing vertices does not cover
the worst scenario of adversary’ maximum back-
ground knowledge, i.e., an adversary has the full
knowledge of the map including all vertices and
edges except one edge on the trajectory, which
arises in many real-life applications requiring pro-
tection of an sensitive connection between two en-
tities such as supply chain, financial trading and
intelligence exchange. In this case, the published
(perturbed, privacy-preserved) path by the exist-
ing work is vulnerable to preserve the existence of
an arbitrary edge of the original path, because the
adversary can reconstruct the missing edge by the
existence of an edge in the perturbed path whose
two ends are close to the two ends of the missing
edge. Figure 1 depicts a running attack against ex-
isting work. Second, the existing work does not in
general publish real vertices on the path, so it is
hard for the genuine users (who have full informa-
tion about the network) to reconstruct the original
path from the published one to confirm the exact
links between the real vertices.
a′
b′
c′
d′
a
b
c
d
: published path
: attackers’ partial path
: guessing sampling set
by vertices closeness
Missing Edge Discovered:
Edge (b, c) must be in the path
Figure 1: A Running Attack against the Exist-
ing Algorithms of Differentially Private Trajectory
Publishing
To fill the research gap, this paper studies how
to protect an arbitrary edge in path publishing. In
summary, our main contributions are:
• We address the problem of differentially pri-
vate path publishing in a generalised form
against inference attacks from adversaries with
more background knowledge than the existing
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work. Different from the existing work where
the adversary knows the network topology and
n−1 out of n vertices of the path, we preserve
privacy against adversaries who have the full
knowledge of the network and all vertices on
the path except one missing edge of the path
(network);
• Our proposed method guarantees a high data
utility and security (differential privacy). That
is, the genuine users (who have the full knowl-
edge of the network) are able to reconstruct
the path but the adversaries are unable to in-
fer the missing edge and hence reconstruct the
path. In particular, we publish a graph-based
path where fake edges and duplicate real ver-
tices are created to embed the real path into a
graph for publishing, such that only the gen-
uine users are able to reconstruct the exact
vertices and edges of the original path, and de-
termine the visiting order of the vertices with
high probability;
• We evaluate the key properties of the proposed
method both theoretically and experimentally.
Specifically, we mathematically analyse differ-
ential privacy guarantee and data utility of our
scheme. We conduct experiments on a cluster
system and extensively evaluate our scheme
with synthetic datasets for various network
sizes and densities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that considers edge privacy, i.e., the existence of an
edge between two vertices as privacy, in differen-
tially private path publishing.
Organisation. The rest of this paper is organ-
ised as follows: In Section 2, we discuss existing
work on differentially private single trajectory pub-
lishing for both the advantages and disadvantages.
Next, in Section 3, we give a brief introduction of
the preliminaries of this paper, including differen-
tial privacy, path model and the attackers’ back-
ground knowledge. Then we propose our differen-
tially private single path publishing in Section 4.
Mathematical analysis are also showed in this sec-
tion. Afterwards, in Section 5, we provide the ex-
perimental evaluation to the performance of our al-
gorithms on a synthetic dataset. Finally, we con-
clude this paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
In this section, we briefly summarise the state-of-
the-art work of differentially private single trajec-
tory publishing in both advantages and disadvan-
tages.
As far as we know, [17] is the first differentially
private algorithm for single trajectory publishing.
In [17], Jiang et. al. proposed a Sampling Distance
and Direction (SDD) mechanism, which publishes
a partially perturbed trajectory. In the published
trajectory of SSD, the first and the last locations
come from the original trajectory directly. While,
for each of the rest locations, say fake location i,
were determined by a noisy distance and a noisy
direction based on the real location i − 1. Expo-
nential mechanism of differential privacy (ExpDP)
was used for sampling the noisy distance and direc-
tion.
Xiao et. al. [30, 31] observed that the temporal-
spatio relationship may release privacy even though
a perturbed trajectory was published. So a δ-
Location set for each location in the trajectory was
prepared in [30]. All the locations in the δ-Location
set satisfy the requirement for the temporal-spacial
relationship. Then, the most possible location to
replace the real one in the original trajectory will
be sampled via ExpDP from the δ-Location set. In
addition, a Planar Isotropic Mechanism (PIM) was
proposed to achieve optimal lower bound of DP for
the δ-Location set. In addition, Cao et. al. [3] pro-
posed a Private Spatio-Temporal Event (PriSTE)
framework to further study the spatio-temporal pri-
vacy of [30] for choosing better fake locations in a
given trajectory.
Similar to [17], He et. al. [14, 15] proposed a
Differentially Private Trajectories (DPT) system to
select the most similar and possible location in a
given area to replace a real location in the trajec-
tory. The DPT system was achieved by three key
components: hierarchical referencing, model selec-
tion, and direction weighted sampling. Specifically,
hierarchical referencing firstly generates a bunch of
possible trajectory candidates. Afterwards, model
selection selects a trajectory with ExpDP. Finally,
direction weighted sampling adjusts the directions
of each location in the fake trajectory to meet the
directions in the original trajectory.
Wang et. al. [27] proposed a Private Trajec-
tory Calibration System (PTCS), which applies a
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clustering-based method to find the fake locations
to replace the real ones for the published trajectory.
In PTCS, as a initialisation step, frequently visited
locations of the user, whose trajectory will be pub-
lished then, are clustered firstly. Then an anchor
location in each cluster is picked as the represen-
tative of the cluster. For a give trajectory of the
user, each location in this trajectory is replaced by
its nearest anchor location to form the published
trajectory.
In summary, by considering the features of a tra-
jectory, such as the movement directions, temporal-
spacial relationships, the state-of-the-art achieve
satisfying trade-off between privacy guarantee and
data utility for future study on the published tra-
jectory. However, because of the published fake
vertices, even the trusted path participates cannot
recover the original path. Furthermore, due to their
assumption on the attackers’ background knowl-
edge, these works are vulnerable under our assump-
tion of the attackers, i.e., the attackers know the
vertices in a path but miss some edges. The attack-
ers with such background knowledge can definitely
infer the privacy from the published path by exist-
ing work in differentially private single trajectory
publishing.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the notion of
privacy used in this paper, i.e., differential privacy,
the models for map and path, and our assumption
on the adversaries’ auxiliary information.
3.1 Differential Privacy.
Differential Privacy (DP) is a famous notion of pri-
vacy in recent privacy-preserving research field [12,
19, 26, 20], which was firstly introduced and defined
by Dwork et at. [8]. Informally, DP is a scheme
that minimises the sensitivity of output for a given
statistical operation on two neighbouring (differen-
tiated in one arbitrary record to protect) datasets.
That is, DP guarantees the presence or absence of
any item in a dataset will be concealed to the ad-
versaries with maximum auxiliary information.
In DP, the basic setting is a pair of neighbouring
datasets X and X ′, where X ′ contains the informa-
tion of all the items except one item in a dataset X.
A formal definition of Differential Privacy is shown
as follow:
Definition 1 (-DP [8]). A randomised mechanism
A is -differentially private if for all neighbouring
datasets X and X ′ in domain D, and for an arbi-
trary answer s ∈ Range(A), A satisfies:
Pr[A(X) = s] ≤ exp() · Pr[A(X ′) = s]
where  is the privacy budget.
Two parameters are essential to DP: the privacy
budget  and the function sensitivity (global) ∆f ,
i.e. ∆f(X), where f is the query function to the
dataset X. The privacy budget  is set by the
trusted dataset curator (who has full access to the
dataset X). Theoretically, a smaller  denotes a
higher privacy guarantee because the privacy bud-
get  reflects the magnitude of the difference be-
tween two neighbouring datasets. ∆f is calculated
by the following equation,
∆f(X) = max
∀X∈D
|f(X)− f(X ′)|,
In this paper, we mainly use the Exponential
mechanism of DP (ExpDP) [23]. In general, the
ExpDP is suitable for preserving privacy in the non-
numeric computation. The ExpDP introduces a
quality function q(X,x) which reflects how appeal-
ing the pair (X,x) is, where X denotes a dataset
and x is the random respond to a query function
on the dataset X. When applying the ExpDP, we
can simply treat it as a weighted sampling, where
the quality function assigns weights to the sample
space. The formal definition of ExpDP is shown
below:
Definition 2 (Exponential Mechanism [23]).
Given a quality function of a dataset X, q(X,x),
which reflects the quality of a query respond x. The
exponential mechanism A provides -differential
privacy, if A(X) =
{
Pr[x] ∝ exp
(
·q(X,x)
2∆q
)}
,
where ∆q is the sensitivity of the quality function
q(X,x),  is the privacy budget.
3.2 Network and Path Models
Without loss of generality, a network (e.g.,
roadmap, internet node map, spy network, etc.) is
a bidirected/undirected graph N = (V,E), where
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V is the set of vertices, E is the set of edges. In this
paper, the network is a connected graph to contain
the path P .
The path P = (V,EP ⊂ E) is a subset of
the network N . We define the path as a se-
quence of vertices in visiting order, i.e., a path
P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, where vi ∈ V is the ith vertex
in P , ei = (vi, vi+1) ∈ EP is the ith edge in P .
Since the path P may contain rings, we may have
∃i 6= j, vi(∈ V ) = vj(∈ V ).
a b
c d
e f E :
P : a→ f ,
E′ : E \ {(c, d)}
P ′ : Maybe:
f → d→ a→ c
Figure 2: An Example of Network, Path, and Ad-
versaries’ Background Knowledge
3.3 Adversaries’ Auxiliary Informa-
tion
Different from the assumption of adversaries’ aux-
iliary information in existing work of differentially
private trajectory publishing, we assume the ad-
versaries have correct information about the ver-
tices but incorrect information about the edges of
the path. We take the worst case of the adver-
saries’ auxiliary information in this paper, so the
adversaries do not know the existence of one edge
in the original path P (and the network N), say
ei = (vi, vi+1). That is, the adversaries have N
′ =
(V,E′), P ′ = (V,EP ′) that ei = E \E′ = EP \EP ′ .
Figure 2 illustrates the models of network, path and
the adversaries’ background knowledge.
4 Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we will show our differentially pri-
vate algorithm to preserve privacy in path publish-
ing against the adversaries with background knowl-
edge described in Section 3.3. In a nutshell, we
propose a graph-based path publishing which uses
the topology of the original network and the con-
nections between vertices of the path to conceal the
edge existence against the adversaries who do not
have full knowledge about the edges in the given
network.
4.1 Idea Overview
The idea of our graph-based differentially private
path publishing was inspired by the permutation
idea in [12]. Especially, same as [12], the receivers
of the published graph-based path are path partici-
pates, which can either be each vertex or each edge
in the network. For example, in the intelligence ex-
change network, we aim to let all spies know whom
should connect with, so the path participates are
spies, i.e., the vertices in a network. In Internet
traffic flow analysis, we want to monitor a given
flow, so the path participates are the routers be-
tween servers, i.e., the edges in a network.
In general, when building our graph-based path,
we apply differential privacy to introduce uncer-
tainties to hide the exact information about edges
in the path with the following privacy-preserving
rules for the published graph-based path.
1. For the edge e = (u, v) ∈ EP , vertex u and v
are not placed in a same branch in the graph-
based path;
2. For the edge e = (u, v) ∈ E \EP , vertex u and
v are placed in a same branch in the graph-
based path;
3. For the non-existent vertex connections e =
(u, v) /∈ E, vertex u and v are randomly (by
DP) either in or not in a same branch in the
graph-based path;
4. For the vertices appear multiple times in the
graph-based path, it does not implicitly indi-
cate that those vertices are in a circle or not
(because of DP);
5. For a group of nodes without parent and a
group of nodes without child in the graph-
based path, we place the group, which contains
the vertex closest to the first node of the path,
as the root of the graph-based path.
Particularly, because the path participates have
full knowledge about the existence of edges, Rule 1
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G:
a b
c
d
e f
H:
a b
c
d
e f
GP :
a
bc
de
f
Network N contains an acyclic path P (Figure 2) → (G,H) → graph-based path GP
Figure 3: An Example of Producing the Graph-based Path
and Rule 2 guarantees the path participates can
recover the exact vertices and edges of the path;
Rule 5 let the path participates determine the vis-
iting order of the original path with high probabil-
ity. In contrast, Rule 3 and Rule 4 introduce the
uncertainties against the adversaries who do not
have full knowledge about P , i.e., edge(s) missing
in this paper.
Path reconstruction. The following steps help
to recover the exact path from the published graph-
based path. Firstly, each path participate confirms
its status in the path P according to Rule 1 and
Rule 2. Specifically, the vertices (as the path par-
ticipates) check their neighbour vertices; the edges
(as the path participates) check their two ends.
Then the path participates exchange their status
(possibly by secure multi-party computing [32]) to
recognise the two ends of the path P . Finally, the
path participates take one of the two ends, which
is the closest node to the vertices as the roots of
the graph-based path, as the starting point of the
path. According to Rule 5, with high probability,
each participate learns its index in the path, i.e.,
the visiting order of the path.
Producing the graph-based path. To imple-
ment the privacy-preserving rules, in general, we
split the give network N to two sub-graphs: one
(graph G) contains the edges not in P ; one (graph
H) contains the edges in P , but both of the two sub-
graphs may contain some edges not in N . Then
producing the graph-based path becomes the fol-
lowing problem. Given a graph G = (VG, EG), U
consists of all 2-element subsets of VG, andG’s com-
plement H = (VH = VG, EH = U \ EG), which is
a Hamilton graph, e.g., P is one Hamilton path in
H. In this paper, we take G as the input for pro-
ducing GP = (VG, EGP ), such that if u, v are in
a branch of GP , then e = (u, v) ∈ EG; otherwise,
e = (u, v) ∈ EH .
Note that, for the given network N = (V,E), we
have (E \ EP ) ⊂ EG because it is possible that
∃e ∈ EG, that e /∈ E according to Rule 3; V ⊂ VG
because it is possible ∃v ∈ VG, that v /∈ V according
to Rule 4. Figure 3 depicts an example of producing
GP from G and H. Additionally, we should have
an acyclic path in H; otherwise even the genuine
path participates cannot recover the exact path.
For example, consider using the original network
in Figure 4 to produce a GP , it is easy to conclude
that such a GP cannot recognise whether e or c is
the succeeder of b when we visit b the first time.
Furthermore, G and GP are equivalent for a
graph-based path publishing. G hides the path
information, and potentially indicates the visiting
order with Rule 4; however it causes high computa-
tional cost for recovering the real path. Corollary 1
proves that it takes O(|V |+ |E|) for each path par-
ticipate to recover its status in the path from G;
in contrast, O(|V |) from GP . Especially, in the
worst case, O(|V | + |E|) is equivalent to O(|V |2),
i.e., O(|V |) O(|V |+ |E|).
In addition, Table 1 lists the notations used in
this paper.
4.2 Map Pre-processing
In this section, we pre-process the given network
to meet our privacy-preserving Rule 3, Rule 4 and
the additionally acyclic requirement for graph H
by injecting duplicate vertices and fake edges with
the exponential mechanism of DP (ExpDP).
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Table 1: The summary of notations.
Notation Description
·′ The corresponding notation of adversaries’ background knowledge
·ˆ The processed ·
E; EG; EP The set of edges in N ; in G; in P
G The input graph to produce GP
GP The published graph-based path of this paper
H The complement graph of G
N The network contains the path P
P The original path for publishing
V ; VG The set of vertices in N and P ; in G
The Give Network:
a b
e d
c f
Cyclic path:
a→ b→ c→ d→ e→ b→ c→ f
Processed Network with DP Vertices:
a0 b0 c0
d0
d1
e0
b1
c1 f0
Acyclic path:
a0 → b0 → c0 → d0 → e0 → b1 → c1 → f0
Figure 4: An Example of DP Vertices Pre-processing
4.2.1 Differentially Private Vertices Pre-
processing
To convert a network to fit Rule 4 and the acyclic
requirement, in this section, we borrow the inher-
itance concept in objective-oriented programming
(OOP) to create base vertices and sub-vertex(s) in
a network. Such an idea comes from a feature of
a cyclic path, that is, when there is a cyclic path
in the network, at least one vertex is repeatedly
visited.
In this paper, all the unique vertices in the given
network N are the base vertices; and all the re-
peated visited vertices in the path P and the du-
plicate vertices created by DP are sub-vertices.
The relationship between base vertex and its sub-
vertex(s) should be public available; otherwise, the
path participates cannot recognise the sub-vertices
then further reconstruct the exactly original path.
Similar to the inheritance in OOP, each sub-vertex
inherits the connections from its corresponding
base vertex. When inheriting a connection, the
sub-vertices have to decide whether such a connec-
tion belongs the G or H. Figure 4 illustrates the
idea of base vertex and sub-vertices. For example,
in Figure 4, because vertex b and c are connected in
the network N , their sub-vertices: b0, b1 and c0, c1
are connected in the processed network Nˆ . More-
over, according to the cyclic path in the original
network, (b0, c0) ∈ EP , but (b0, c1) /∈ EP .
Although such an operation converts a cyclic
path to an acyclic one, there is a potential privacy
disclosure risk against the adversaries know m− 1
out ofm edges as the background knowledge. In de-
tails, since the relationship between the base vertex
and sub-vertices is public available, it is easy for the
adversaries to learn whether there is a ring or not
in the path based on those sub-vertices, then fur-
ther infer the missing edge. Therefore, to preserve
privacy (hide the real ring of the path) against such
adversaries, we apply ExpDP to create more sub-
vertices (duplicate ones), e.g., vertex d1 in Figure 4
is a duplicate sub-vertex created with ExpDP.
To create the duplicate sub-vertices, the main
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task is about the number of sub-vertices for
a given base vertex. To minimise the overall
number of vertices after pre-processing, we ap-
ply ExpDP to sample a number from a range
[num,max{maxNum, 2}] for each base vertex,
where num is the number of appearance of a given
base vertices in the original path, maxNum =
max{num} for all base vertices, e.g., maxNum = 2
in the cyclic path in Figure 4 because the maximum
appearance of a vertex is 2, comes from both vertex
b and c.
To confuse the adversaries whether there is a ring
or not in the original path P , we want the numbers
of sub-vertices of base vertices are indistinguish-
able. That is, the base vertex with smaller degree
(means less chances to be visited repeatedly) would
have higher probability to have more duplicate sub-
vertices. For simplicity, in this paper, we have the
following quality function to measure the number
(n) of duplicate sub-vertices for base vertex i, where
di is the degree of base vertex i:
qv(n, i) = max{n} − n+ max{di} − di. (1)
According to the adversaries’ background knowl-
edge, the sensitivity of qv(n, i) is determined by the
maximum degree difference when there is an edge
in the path missing. That is, ∆qv = max{|qv(n, i)−
qv(n, i
′)|} = 1,∀ base vertex i.
Algorithm 1 shows how we convert a cyclic
path to an acyclic one while adding duplicate
sub-vertices to the processed network with Ex-
pDP (a.k.a. differentially private ring removal).
Lemma 1 proves the differential privacy guarantee
of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 is v-differentially private.
Proof. In our vertices pre-processing, we add du-
plicate vertices to the original network with quality
function qv (Equation (1)) and privacy budget v,
we have Equation (2) to calculate its overall pri-
vacy budget for this step, where VP is the set of
real vertices in the path P (∃u, v ∈ VP , u = v),
Vm is the set of mixed real and duplicate vertices.
Note that, the difference between VP and V
′
P (ad-
versaries’) is that we have two pairs of (v, v′) that
|v.degree− v′.degree| = 1, where v ∈ VP , v′ ∈ V ′P ,
v = v′. Since we assume that the path is acyclic, we
split the set VP to two sub sets: Vs and Vr, where
Vs contains the vertices appear only once in the
Algorithm 1: Pre-process Differentially Pri-
vate Vertices (a.k.a. Differentially Private Ring
Removal).
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, n ≥ |V |;
A quality function: qv ;
A privacy budgets: v .
Output: A Hamilton network Nˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ);
An acyclic path Pˆ .
1 (Vˆ , Eˆ) ← (V,E);
2 Pˆ ← P ;
3 maxDegree ← max{v.degree in P,∀v ∈ V };
4 for each v ∈ V do
5 v.subNum ← Sample a number from
[v.baseNum,maxDegree] with qv (Eq. (1)) and
v ;
6 for i← 2 to v.subNum do
7 v.subi−1 ← v;
8 if i ≤ v.baseNum then
9 replace ith v ∈ Pˆ with v.subi−1;
10 else
11 Pˆ ← Pˆ .push(v.subi−1);
12 for each v ∈ V do
13 for each u ∈ V , that e = (v, u) ∈ E do
14 for each u.subi /∈ Vˆ do
15 Vˆ ← Vˆ + {u.subi};
16 Eˆ ← Eˆ + {(v, u.subi)};
17 return: Nˆ , Pˆ ;
path, Vr contains the vertices are repeated visited.
Pr[VP → Vm]
Pr[V ′P → Vm]
=
Pr[Vs → Vm0]× Pr[Vr → Vm1]
Pr[V ′s → Vm0]× Pr[V ′r → Vm1]
=
∏
v.degree=v′.degree
Pr[v.subNum = s]
Pr[v′.subNum = s]
×
∏
v.degree6=v′.degree
Pr[v.subNum = s]
Pr[v′.subNum = s]
=
∏
v.degree6=v′.degree
Pr[v.subNum = s]
Pr[v′.subNum = s]
≤ exp(max{v}) = exp(v).
(2)
The last step of Equation (2) comes from the paral-
lel composition of differential privacy [22]. There-
fore, this lemma holds.
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4.2.2 Differentially Private Edges Pre-
processing
When having a network N contains an acyclic path
P , according to whether an edge belongs to the
path or not, we split the processed network N =
(V,E) into two graphs: G = (VG = V,EG = E \
EP ) and H = P . Then to fit Rule 3, we turn all
the non-existent vertex connections in this network
to edges either in G or H randomly by ExpDP.
To do so, we firstly create a vertices relationship
matrix R|V |×|V | for the path according to the real
topology of the network, where
ru,v = 2, if e = (u, v) ∈ E \ EP ;
ru,v = 1, if e = (u, v) ∈ EP ;
ru,v = 0, if e = (u, v) /∈ E;
ru,v = −1, if u = v.
(3)
Now we shall replace the non-existent edges (r =
0) to fake edges either in the path (r = 1) or not
(r = 2) with ExpDP. To conceal any possible miss-
ing edge as the adversaries’ background knowledge,
we want to have more fake edges. Therefore r = 2
should have higher quality when implementing Ex-
pDP for adding fake edges. Because the adversaries
have different number of edges than us, to measure
the quality of r = 1 and r = 2, in this paper, we
have qe(2) = (|E| − 1)/|E|, qe(1) = 1/|E|, namely
qe(x) =
|E| − 2
|E| x−
|E| − 3
|E| , (4)
where ∆qe = |qe(1)− qe(2)| = (|E| − 2)/|E| ≈ 1.
Algorithm 2 shows our differentially private
edges pre-processing. Lemma 2 proves the differ-
ential privacy guarantee of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Pre-process Differentially Pri-
vate Edges.
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn};
A quality function: qe;
A privacy budgets: e.
Output: A vertices relational matrix R|V |×|V |.
1 R|V |×|V | ← Traverse N from v, values in R
determined by Eq. (3);
2 for each ru,v = 0 do
3 ru,v ← 1 or 2 with qe (Eq. (4)) and e;
4 return: R|V |×|V |;
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 is (e + ln 2)-differentially
private.
Proof. In our edges pre-processing, because we turn
all the non-existent connections in the network N
to an edge in either graph G or graph H with qual-
ity function qe (Equation (4)) and privacy budget
e, we have Equation (5) to calculate its overall pri-
vacy budget for this step.
Pr[N → (G,H)]
Pr[N ′ → (G,H)]
=
∏
edgesToG
exp( eqe(2)2∆qe )
exp( eqe(2)2∆qe )
×
∏
edgesToH
exp( eqe(1)2∆qe )
exp( eqe(1)2∆qe )
× 1
Pr[edge(= E \ E′)ToH]
=
exp( eqe(2)2∆qe ) + exp(
eqe(1)
2∆qe
)
exp( eqe(1)2∆qe )
≤2 exp(e) = exp(e + ln 2).
(5)
Therefore, this lemma holds.
4.3 Graph-based Path Producing
In this section, we have Algorithm 3 to generate
our graph-based path from the differentially pri-
vate matrix R|V |×|V |. In Algorithm 3, we first call
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to pre-process a dif-
ferentially private network, then we insert each ver-
tex of the path into the graph GP one by one by
calling Algorithm 4 in Line 3 of Algorithm 3 to have
an initial GP for publishing. To recover the visiting
order of the original path with GP , we check two
groups of vertices: roots and leaves. The group,
contains the vertex which is closer to the real first
vertex in the path P , will serve as the roots in the
final output. That is, to fit Rule 5, we may turn
GP upside down to have the final output. This
operation is implemented from Line 4 to Line 5 in
Algorithm 3.
According to the sequential composition of dif-
ferential privacy [22], based on Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, we have Theorem 1 to study the over-
all privacy budget of differential privacy of Algo-
rithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Publish Graph-based Differen-
tially Private Path.
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn};
Two quality functions: qv and qe;
Two privacy budgets: v and e.
Output: A graph-based path GP .
1 Nˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ), Pˆ ← Call Alg. 1 with (N,P, qv , v);
2 R ← Call Alg. 2 with (Nˆ, Pˆ , qe, e);
3 (Vˆ , Eˆ) ← Call Alg. 4 with (Pˆ ,R);
4 if u ∈ Vˆleaves is closer to v1 then
5 Vˆ ← reverse the order of layers in Vˆ ;
6 return: GP ← (Vˆ , Eˆ);
Theorem 1. Algorithm 3 is (v + e + ln 2)-
differentially private.
Furthermore, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 study
the probability of recovering the correct the path
P from the published GP .
Lemma 3. There are at least two roots in the
graph-based path, where two of the roots share an
edge of the path.
Proof. Assume there is only one root, v, in the
graph-based path, then v’s neighbour vertex in the
path, u, will be in the same branch as v. This
is contradict to our first rule for this graph-based
path, namely, v and u should be placed into differ-
ent branches. That is, at least both u and v are
the roots of the graph-based path. Therefore, this
corollary holds.
Proposition 1. Given a path P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn},
our graph-based path GP (without DP injection)
has at least 1/2 probability to confirm the visiting
order of P in expected case.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, we assume there are
k ≥ 4 vertices are roots and leaves in GP . There
is only one case that GP cannot confirm the first
node of P : Among the k vertices, vertex v, which
is the closest one to the first node, and vertex u,
which is the closest one to the last node, are both
roots. In expected cases, the probability of such
case in all possible graph G is 2/
(
k
2
)
= 4k(k−1)
because the roots set and the leaves set are ex-
changeable. Moreover, u should be closer to the
last node than v to the first node. We assume it
has Pr ∈ [0, 1] probability to have such case. Then
GP has 1− Pr× 4k(k−1) probability to confirm the
real visiting order of P , which is at least 2/3. In
addition, consider a special network with n vertices
and n− 1 edges. Give a P from such network, be-
cause both first node and last node will be the root
in the graph-based path, we have 1/2 probability
to confirm the real first node. Therefore, we have
probability 1/2 = min{1/2, 2/3} to confirm the vis-
iting order of of P , so that proposition holds.
Algorithm 4: Insert Vertex.
Input : A path P ;
A vertices relationship matrix R.
Output: A vertex superset Vˆ and an edge set Eˆ
1 Init: An empty stack S, Sbak ← S, layer.top← 0,
layer.bottom← 0, u← P.dequeue(), u.layer ← 0;
2 S.push(u);
3 v ← P.pop();
4 while P 6= ∅ do
5 if v.visit = 0 then
6 for i ← layer.top− 1 to layer.bottom+ 1 do
7 if Call Alg. 5 with (S, v,R, i) then
8 v.layerRange ← v.layerRange+ {i};
9 if v.layerRange 6= ∅ then
10 v.layer ← max{v.layerRange};
11 layer.top ← min∀x∈S{x.layer, v.layer};
12 layer.bottom ← max∀x∈S{x.layer, v.level};
13 v.visit← 1, S.push(v);
14 v ← P.pop(), v.visit ← 0;
15 if |S| > |Sbak| then
16 (Sbak,Rbak, Pbak, vbak) ← (S,R, P, v);
17 else
18 P.push(v);
19 v ← S.pop(), v.layerRange ←
v.layerRange− {v.layer}, v.layer ← nil;
20 if v = u then
21 (S,R)← Call Alg. 6 with
(Sbak,Rbak, vbak);
22 P ← Pbak, v ← P.pop(), v.visit← 0;
23 for each v ∈ S do
24 if rv,x = 2, ∀x ∈ S then
25 Eˆ ← e = (v, x);
26 Vv.layer ← Vv.layer + {v};
27 Eˆ ← Remove duplicate edges;
28 Vˆ ← {Vi}, ∀i ∈ [layer.top, layer.bottom];
29 return: (Vˆ , Eˆ);
Algorithm 4 is the principal part for produc-
ing the graph-based path GP . Generally, in Algo-
rithm 4, we maintain and track the status of each
vertex in the process of inserting to ensure the ver-
tices are correctly placed in the graph-based path.
Clearly, because we hide the exact information of
the path in the topology of the graph-based path,
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the layers in GP , where we place the vertices, play
an important role for us. So we prepare a possible
layers set for each vertex against the present graph
at the moment when placing the vertex into GP
(Line 5 to Line 8 in Algorithm 4). To ensure the
first node of the path could be placed as the root in
the graph-based path, we always use the maximum
layer from the set for inserting the vertex (Line 10
to Line 14 in Algorithm 4).
To compute such a possible layers set, we exclude
all the bad layers which introduce contradiction to
our graph building rules in Algorithm 5. Claim 1
studies the way to navigate the bad layers when
inserting a vertex v to GP .
Algorithm 5: Test Insertion Layer.
Input : A stack S;
A vertex u;
A vertices relationship matrix R;
A given layer n.
Output: A boolean status.
1 if ru′s parent,u′s child = 1 then
2 return: False;
3 for each v ∈ S do
4 if v.layer = n AND ru,v = 2 then
5 return: False;
6 if v.layer > n AND ru,v = 2 AND ru,v′s child = 1
then
7 return: False;
8 if v.layer < n AND ru,v = 2 AND
ru,v′s parent = 1 then
9 return: False;
10 return: True;
Claim 1. The connectivity is transitive in a branch
in GP .
Claim 1 shows an important feature of our graph-
based path: all the vertices in one branch should be
connected to each other. That is, when inserting v
to GP , a bad layer for v breaks either our Rule 2
for GP or such transitive relation in Claim 1. The
upper half of Figure 5 shows a counterexample to
Claim 1. Given u, x ∈ GP , ru,x = 2, when inserting
v ∈ P to GP where rv,u = rv,x = 1, there is no good
layer for v, if ∃y ∈ GP that ry,v = ry,u = ry,x = 2
and y’s layer in GP is between u’s and x’s. This
case indicates that there may be bad placement(s)
from the existing vertices which are already placed
in the present graph. To overcome the bad place-
ment(s), we record each inserted vertex in a stack.
When we have a vertex with an empty possible lay-
ers set, the stack enables us to backtrack and re-
insert the recently inserted vertices until we can
successfully insert all the vertices into the graph.
This backtracking operation is implemented from
Line 18 to Line 19 in Algorithm 4. The lower half
of Figure 5 illustrates an example for addressing
this issue.
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v
v
v
u
y
x
v
y u
y
x
v
GP :
+ →
(bad: v connects to x)
(bad: v and y not in a branch)
(bad: v connects to u)
Adjusted GP :
+ → (good)
Figure 5: An Example of Claim 1
Based on Claim 1, we have Theorem 2 which
studies the existence of our graph-based path.
Theorem 2. The graph-based path exists, unless
∃u ∈ P , that u breaks the transitive relation in all
possible topology of GP .
According to Theorem 2, it is possible to have a
network which cannot deliver a graph-based path
GP . Namely, to insert a vertex u to a GP , af-
ter trying all the possible layers of each vertex in
the present GP by backtracking the stack in Al-
gorithm 4, we cannot find a good layer to insert
u. The upper half of Figure 6 shows an example
of bad GP by Theorem 2 where the present GP is
the only possible topology with the given vertices
a, b, c, and d. As we can see, there is no way to
appropriately insert e to the present GP .
The reason behind this conflict when inserting
a vertex is straightforward. When a vertex u has
multiple connections in the network, according to
Rule 1, Rule 2, and Claim 1, the topology of the
graph-based path may not satisfy all the transitive
relation relevant to u at the same time. To address
11
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with conflict:
↓
GP without conflict:
Figure 6: An Example of Resolving Conflicts in GP
this problem, we propose Algorithm 6 to eliminate
such a conflict. Generally, the main idea of Algo-
rithm 6 is splitting the vertices, which break the
transitive relation in branches in the present GP
when u comes, to several pieces according to its de-
gree and connectivity in the network. As a result,
each piece takes less connections from the original
vertex. This way, it is easier to satisfy the con-
nectivity of the conflict vertex. In Algorithm 6,
when splitting a vertex v, we have v.connections =⋂
i vi.connections, where i ≤ v.degree. The lower
half of Figure 6 illustrates that after splitting the
vertex e, we resolve the conflict by splitting vertex
e. The new GP satisfies all our rules for a graph-
based path.
Note that, the splitting operation in Algorithm 6
is different to the differentially private vertices pre-
processing in Algorithm 1. Because in Algorithm 1,
the sub-vertices are duplicates of the base vertex
but have different connections according to the po-
sitions of the duplicates, i.e., some of the sub-
vertices are fake ones; while in Algorithm 6, after
splitting the base vertex, each piece of the base ver-
tex inherits partial connections from its base ver-
tex, i.e., those pieces of vertices are not fake ones.
Theorem 3 proves that this splitting operation en-
sures us always having a graph-based path from
any input network and path.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 6 guarantees to produce a
graph which satisfies our rules for the graph-based
path.
Algorithm 6: Resolve Inserting Conflicts.
Input : A stack S;
A vertices relationship matrix R;
A vertex v0.
Output: A stack S;
A vertices relationship matrix R.
1 Sconflict ← ∅;
2 layer.top← min∀u∈S{u.layer};
3 layer.bottom← max∀u∈S{u.layer};
4 for each u ∈ S do
5 Sconflict.push(the conflicting u for v);
6 S.remove(u);
7 if Sconflict = ∅ then
8 Sconflict.push(v0);
9 for each u ∈ Sconflict do
10 Stemp ← ∅;
11 for l ∈ [layer.top− 1, layer.bottom+ 1] do
12 Sl ← Insert the suitable v ∈ S if u.layer = l;
13 Stemp.push(Sl);
14 Stemp ← Solve a set cover for u and Stemp;
15 Split u according to Stemp;
16 (S,R) ← Insert the split us to S and R;
17 if v0 /∈ S then
18 S ← Insert v to S as Alg. 4;
19 return: S and R;
Proof. When we split a vertex, we do not create
new edges, i.e., new connections between vertices,
so this splitting strategy keeps all the connectivities
in G (show in Figure 3). Furthermore, by splitting
the conflict vertex v, we avoid satisfying v’s connec-
tivity all together by one vertex but multiple new
vertices separately. Especially, in the worst case,
when inserting a vertex v for all vertices, we can
always split it according to its degree in G. This
way, we will finally have a forest GP where each
single edge in G served as a tree. Therefore, such
graph follows all our rules for building our graph-
based path for recovering the original path.
Finally, we study the depth of GP in Proposi-
tion 2 which assists the proof of Corollary 1 for the
time complexity for each path participate recover-
ing its status in the path.
Proposition 2. The depth of the graph-based path,
which is the length of the longest branch, is at most
|VG|/2.
Proof. According to the way we build the graph-
based path, the longest branch comes from the
maximum-sized complete sub-graph in G. Because
we construct G by removing the edges of path from
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(and adding the non-existent edges into) the orig-
inal network, in the worst case, there are at most
|VG|/2 vertices could form such a complete sub-
graph in G. Therefore, this proposition holds.
Corollary 1. It takes O(|VG|) time complexity for
a path participate to recover its status in the path
from our graph-based path (GP in Figure 3).
Proof. For path participate, to recover its status
from G, it takes O(|VG| + |EG|) time complexity
to traverse all the edges connected with its one
end in G. In the worst case, O(|EG|) is equiva-
lent to O(|VG|2). However, according to Proposi-
tion 2, each vertex in GP has at most O|VG| edges.
Then, for path participate, it takes O(|VG|+ |VG|)
to search all the edges connected with its one end
in GP . Therefore, O(|VG|) time complexity to con-
firm whether an edge is in the path or not.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we show our experimental evalua-
tion against our proposed algorithm, including the
dataset we used, experimental configurations, and
the experimental results.
5.1 Dataset and Configurations
According to the inputs of our algorithm, we need a
dataset contains a map where all vertices form the
path. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm
over different sizes of graphs, in this paper, similar
to [9, 2], we generate and use a synthetic dataset:
undirected map with different sizes and densities,
which contains the path (either acyclic or cyclic) for
publishing. We produce the undirected map with
a given number of vertices |V | and a given number
of edges |E| in three steps. First, we sample all the
vertices from a two-dimensional plane uniformly.
Second, we draw a path for publishing to connect
all the vertices in the map. Third, all the edges not
in the path but in the map are randomly generated
with uniform distribution.
Because our differentially private algorithm is
randomised, according to the law of large num-
bers [29], we report the expected algorithm perfor-
mance of each aspects by calculating the average re-
sults of running the algorithm 1000 times. To simu-
late the real-world scenario, the size of a map/path
in our experiments is no more than 10 vertices. Ac-
cordingly, the number of edges of the synthetic map
is in the range from |V | − 1 (a map only has a
Hamilton path for publishing) to 12 |V |(|V | − 1) (a
complete map). So, in our experiments, we have
overall 122 different sizes of maps as inputs.
The experiments are programmed in Python 3.7,
plotted with MATLAB R2019b, on a node, with
16 cores and 64GB memory, of a super computer
(the Phoenix HPC service at the University of Ade-
laide).
5.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our
algorithm from the following aspects: run time
of our algorithm with differential privacy on ei-
ther vertices or edges; output quality of the ran-
dom maps without both differential privacy and the
splitting strategy for the graph-based path; qual-
ity of the differentially private output. Since our
graph-based path can definitely confirm whether an
edge belongs to the original path, in this section,
we evaluate the output (graph-based path) quality
by testing whether the output could confirm the
visiting order of the original path as showed in Sec-
tion 4.1. In the figures in this section, each point on
a curve stands for a specific map with given number
of vertices and edges.
5.2.1 Run Time
Figure 7 depicts the run time of our algorithm with
acyclic paths over different sizes of the maps and
different settings of differential privacy on either
vertices or edges. It is clear that when increas-
ing the number of vertices, the running time of our
algorithm increases significantly. However, from
Figure 7c and Figure 7d, the increasing number of
edges results in a decreasing run time. The reason
for it is that with a given number of vertices and
a given e, when increasing the number of edges,
less spaces are available for adding fake edges, then
the number of possible topologies of the map is de-
creasing, so it will take less time for our algorithm
to find a suitable graph-based path.
According to Equation (1), more vertices are in-
jected with a smaller privacy budget on vertices v,
so that the run time in Figure 7a (v = 0.5) is much
higher than the run time in Figure 7b (v = 1). Fur-
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Figure 7: Run Time (Acyclic Path).
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 21 28 36 45
|E|
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f U
sa
bl
e 
M
ap
s
|V|=5
|V|=6
|V|=7
|V|=8
|V|=9
|V|=10
(a) Percentage of Usable Map
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 21 28 36 45
|E|
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
oo
d 
O
ut
pu
t w
ith
 U
sa
bl
e 
M
ap
s
|V|=5
|V|=6
|V|=7
|V|=8
|V|=9
|V|=10
(b) Percentage of Good Output with Us-
able Map
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 21 28 36 45
|E|
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f O
ve
ra
ll 
G
oo
d 
O
ut
pu
t
|V|=5
|V|=6
|V|=7
|V|=8
|V|=9
|V|=10
(c) Percentage of Overall Good Output
Figure 8: Output Quality without both DP and The Splitting Strategy.
thermore, based on Equation (4), more edges are
injected to the map (G in Figure 3) with a greater
privacy budget on edges e, then the run time in
Figure 7c (e = 0.5) is much higher than the run
time in Figure 7d (e = 1).
5.2.2 Outputs Quality over Random Maps
without DP
In Figure 8, we study the performance of our graph-
based path without both DP injection and the split-
ting strategy (as Algorithm 6) for different sizes of
maps with acyclic path.
Figure 8a shows the percentage of usable maps
for successfully producing the graph-based path
without the splitting strategy. Particularly, about
43% (52/122) of the maps cannot produce the
graph-based path with over 50% possibilities, espe-
cially for most of the maps (paths) with more than
7 vertices. Moreover, only about 30% (30/122)
maps produce the graph-based path with 100%
guarantee, such maps are the complete graph and
the sparse graphs G = (V,E), that |E| ∈ [|V | −
1, |V |+ 3].
Figure 8b depicts the percentage of good output,
which can confirm the correct visiting order of the
original path, with the usable maps. According to
how we recover the exact path in Section 4.1 from
the graph-based path, in our experiments we count
the good outputs as follows: if we confirm the first
node of the original path directly, we count it as
a good output; if the two ends of the original path
have equal chance to be confirmed as the first node,
we add 0.5 to the total number of good outputs.
Consequently, we have consistent results from both
Figure 8b and Proposition 1. That is, with at least
50% probability, our graph-based path confirms the
visiting order of the original path, so the exact orig-
inal path, if we have full information about the ver-
tices and the existence of the edges of a map. In
addition, Figure 8b also shows that with a given
number of vertices, the number of edges and the
percentage of good outputs are roughly positively
correlated. The reason is that, in average, more
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Figure 9: Output Quality with DP on Acyclic Paths.
edges in the map means more vertices linked to the
first node of the path, then recall Line 3 and Line
10 of Algorithm 4, we will have higher probability
to keep the first node as a root, so to have a good
output. The result illustrated in Figure 8b will be
a base result for analysing the experimental results
in the next section.
Finally, Figure 8c illustrates the Hadamard prod-
uct of Figure 8a and Figure 8b. Namely, the overall
good output percentage without the splitting strat-
egy and DP injection.
5.2.3 Quality of Differentially Private Out-
puts
In this part, we report the output quality of our
algorithm (with consideration of DP injection and
the splitting strategy) on both acyclic paths (in Fig-
ure 9) and cyclic paths (in Figure 10). With the
splitting strategy (Algorithm 6), we always produce
the graph-based path from any map with 100%
guarantee in the experiments, so we do not plot
a figure to present it.
To evaluate the performance of our algorithm on
acyclic paths in the worst case, according to Fig-
ure 8a, we select the maps produce the graph-based
paths with the minimum opportunity for each a
given number of vertices in Figure 9.
In Figure 9a, we only inject DP on vertices to
learn the effect of the differentially private ver-
tices pre-processing (Algorithm 1). Based on Equa-
tion (1) and Figure 8b, with an increasing v, less
fake vertices are added, then we will have an in-
creasing percentage of good output, which fits the
results in Figure 9a.
Figure 9b shows the performance of differentially
private edges pre-process (Algorithm 2). Because a
greater e introduces more edges to the map (G in
Figure 3), then according to the result of Figure 8b,
we expect an increasing percentage of good output
as what we have in Figure 9b.
Comparing the results between Figure 9a and
Figure 9b, because injecting DP on vertices will
introduce fake vertices, it decreases the probabil-
ity of placing the first node of the path as a root,
then it impacts the performance of the graph-based
path more significantly than DP injection on edges.
Therefore, for acyclic path publishing, to protect
private edges, only injecting DP on edges would be
sufficient for both privacy and utility requirements.
When we have a cyclic path in a given map, to
preserve privacy about the path (the existent of a
ring and the existent of an arbitrary edge), DP on
vertices and edges are always needed. Since we al-
ready studied the performance of DP on vertices
in Figure 9a, we inject DP on both vertices and
edges in Figure 10. Specifically, according to Fig-
ure 9b, we tuning v with three fixed es: e = 0.5
in Figure 10a, e = 1 in Figure 10b, and e = 5 in
Figure 10c.
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Figure 10: Output Quality with DP on Cyclic Paths.
In Figure 10, we select the map with 6 vertices
and 10 edges (because it achieves a local minimum
for the percentage of good output) as a base map
for cyclic path publishing. We compare the perfor-
mance between a cyclic path and its corresponding
acyclic path with same number of vertices. With a
give v and a given e, our algorithm achieves better
performance on acyclic paths over cyclic paths. Be-
cause the vertices in a cyclic path have more than
one copies, according to Equation (1), our differen-
tially private vertices pre-processing would create
more vertices for cyclic paths than acyclic paths.
Then based on the result in Figure 8b, more ver-
tices damage the performance of the graph-based
path, such results in Figure 10 fit our expectation.
Additionally, as the same reason behind Figure 9,
when increasing v and e, the percentage of good
output is increased in Figure 10.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a differentially private
graph-based path publishing algorithm. In our
algorithm, we hide the real path in the topol-
ogy of the original network by embedding it in a
graph containing fake edges and vertices applying
the differential privacy technique, so that only the
trusted path participants who have the full knowl-
edge about the existence of the edges in a network
(which contains the target path) can reconstruct
the exact vertices and edges of the original path,
and determine the visiting order of the vertices on
the path with high probability. Our algorithm ef-
fectively protects the edge existence, which is un-
able to achieve with the existing approaches for dif-
ferentially private path publishing which preserve
the existence of vertices. Both theoretical analysis
and experimental evaluation show that our algo-
rithm guarantees both utility and privacy against
the adversaries who miss partial edges information
but have all the vertices information on the path.
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